Nuclear Deterrence: From the Cold War to Present Times

Introduction
The mechanism of balance of power used to be simple. Sovereign units built bigger, better-equipped and better-trained armies than the opponent, all backed by an economic environment which was able to provide supplies to the soldiers. A process which never reached an end; there can could be always more populous armies and more effective weapons.

Nuclear weapon brought a change. Strategic arms reached a point, when even a relatively small and poor country is able to dispose with enough destructive power to erase the whole human society. Twenty years after the collapse of bipolar world, nuclear proliferation remains a hot topic. With nine countries possessing nuclear weapons (with some uncertainty about North Korean and Israel nuclear programs) and some other interested in the possibility of developing them, there are no exactly defined camps of opponents. What is the influence of nuclear weapons on the anarchic system, where ‘the best way to survive is to be especially powerful’? (Mearsheimer, 2007, pp.74). What was the impact of the end of Cold War?

Nuclear weapons
Nuclear warfare is the most important milestone in the history of weapons. Hydrogen bombs, thousand times more effective than atomic (fission) explosives, with practically limitless potential explosive force to be constructed (Mandelbaum, 1981, pp.3) can be delivered by all kinds of ballistic or cruise missiles and artillery. Highly advanced missiles like Russian Topol-M, are able to penetrate any defense systems (Arms Control Association. 2000), making thus the first-strike unstoppable by any kind of defense.

With several thousand nuclear warheads being on alert, major nuclear exchange can result in total destruction of both opponents’ within a few hours since the release of the first missile and also of world’s civilization through effects of radiation and changes in global climate (predicted effects of the so called "nuclear winter" or "nuclear summer"). There are more weapons of mass destruction developed in the 20th century; however, nuclear weapons have an outstanding position, due to the effectiveness of their deployment and their (at least hypothetical) ability to disarm an enemy by the first-strike. Although chemical or biological WMD can have similar effects to nuclear weapons in some occasions, it is considered that they do not share the same military importance for international relations (Mandelbaum, 1981).

Nuclear Deterrence
Concept of deterrence is ‘the dissuasion of one adversary by another from undertaking hostile military action by convincing him that such an action would be unsuccessful or too costly since it would incur military counteraction.’ (Buzan, 1987. pp. 174) and it should not be confused with defense. As Waltz writes: ‘deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend, but through the ability to punish’ (Sagan & Waltz, 2003, pp.5).

It requires set of rules describing consequences of certain actions (Freedman, 2004). Rational actor can use them to compare the gains and expenses of a desired action. In describing the possible range of these actions, Freedman uses ‘typology that never caught on’ (Freedman, 2004, pp.35) from Herman Kahn to describe nature of the actions to be deterred. Type I. involves nuclear exchange between superpowers, type II. conventional or tactical nuclear attack (also on allies) and type III. other kinds of challenges. Freedman also describes two different kinds of deterrence itself: narrow (deterring certain action within war, for example use of WMD) or broad deterrence (deterring war generally).

Realists and liberals examining theories of nuclear deterrence perceive the situation created by the existence of nuclear weapons mostly optimistically (Lieber & Press, 2006). Believing that nuclear weapons can increase the irrationality of starting a war beyond any limits makes some of the scholars to claim ‘more is better’ (Sagan & Waltz, 2003). From there is only one step to theory about nuclear peace, which (unlike democratic peace) can include all countries. Especially for the Cold War era it is broadly believed that nuclear deterrence was among the most important factors which kept USA and USSR away from open mutual war (Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Buzan, 1987; Segal, Moreton, Freedman & Baylis, 1983).

This optimistic approach can be counterweighted by more pessimistic idea, that ‘the H[ydrogen]-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.’ (Hart, 1960, cited in Krepon, 2003). This so called "stability-instability paradox" was found responsible for fuelling number of proxy wars during the Cold War. It is not in complete contradiction with "more is better" statement; we can say it changes this statement into "total proliferation is better".

Cold War
USA incorporated basic thoughts of nuclear deterrence soon after constructing first nuclear bomb (Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be considered as a deterrent action); however it was after Soviet nuclear test in 1949 that nuclear deterrence became standard part of military strategies of both superpowers. Mass introduction of sophisticated nuclear weapons in early sixties resulted in situation, where both superpowers were able to retaliate opponent’s first strike with enough power to turn nuclear war into mutual suicide. This military stalemate became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) (Lieber & Press, 2006). But even if there had been capability to minimize retaliation of a less developed nuclear opponent by a massive first-strike (as it used to be in the first half of 1950′s), the effect of just a single retaliating successful hit would have had disastrous consequences. As Waltz writes: ‘If any part of a force is invulnerable, all of the force is invulnerable.’ (Sagan & Waltz, 2003, pp.143)

US doctrine of "Assured Destruction" defined unacceptable damage as killing 20-30% of Soviet population with retaliating attack. Soviet doctrine included more complex war fighting strategies, but the potential devastating effect on both societies was similar (Segal, Moreton, Freedman & Baylis, 1983). However, it is important to note, that MAD was not the only nuclear doctrine during the whole Cold War. While during Stalin era, official Soviet ideology stressed the inevitability of future mutual war (so deterrence was just a preparation for war), the USA changed official nuclear strategy from MAD to targeting selective military targets during Reagan era (Newman & Dando, 1982).

Besides both superpowers, also United Kingdom and France quickly followed to introduce nuclear arsenal accompanied with deterrence doctrines. Both countries intended to have independent deterrent capability, but while United Kingdom’s nuclear forces were supposed to closely coordinate their activities with US forces (Segal, Moreton, Freedman & Baylis, 1983)], French nuclear armament was not incorporated into NATO systems and was intended to serve solely for France’s protection. This separate stance of France resulted in (unsuccessful) efforts to spread the effect of deterrence also on the North African countries (Boniface, 1998) and was taken into consideration during the siege of Dien Bien Phu (Sagan & Waltz, 2003).

Nuclear deterrence played role not only in the West-East international relations during the cold war. Notably, it helped to keep the status quo during the USSR-PRC border clashes in 1969 (Betts, 1987). Then India introduced nuclear weapon in 1974 to deter China and to reverse the shifting balance of power in times of uncertainty about the actions of USA and Pakistan, which seemed to come closer to China in the seventies. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003, Kaysen, McNamarra & Rathjens, 1991).

These situations refer to what Cohen and Frankel call "visible nuclearization" (Cohen & Frankel, 1991). They also point out the opposite case of proliferation; "opaque nuclearization". Named also as the second generation proliferation, it can be characterized by no testing, denial of possession of nuclear weapons, no presence of any direct nuclear threats, lack of military deployment and doctrines and finally by closed debate and organizational insulation. The Cold War period is to be remembered mainly as a period of vast visible proliferation; however, there were cases of opaque nuclearization.

South Africa constructed several nuclear weapons during the late seventies. While having only limited military use, they were supposed to improve South African isolated political power in case of massive involvement of Soviet Union in border wars with Angola. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons after the government changeover in early nineties (Albright, 1994).

While South Africa is (probably) a closed case, Israel serves as a paradigm case of opacity also for the post-cold war era. Despite multiple changes of government, Israeli officials never admitted possession of nuclear weapons and claim not to be the first to introduce them into the region. Since this position was convenient both for USA and USSR (Frankel, 1991), these leading powers never put pressure on Israel, despite it is believed with certainty that Israel nuclear stockpile counts several hundreds of various weapons. They were supposed to serve as a political tool influencing both US and USSR actions in the region (GlobalSecurity.org, 200-) and still can be considered the ultimate guarantee of the existence of Israel. Situation of Israel has been similar to the situation of India – surrounded by adverse environment and with strong deprived minority inside the country. Despite following similar goals, they chose different forms of nuclear deterrence visibility. The main reason is obvious – adversaries are in possession of nuclear weapons in India’s case, compared to politically unpleasant official introduction of nuclear armament into region in Israeli case.

As it was presented, nuclear deterrence had several forms during the Cold War – deterrence among superpowers (USA and USSR), local deterrence (USSR and China, India and China), nuclear deterrence as an ultimate safety precaution in hostile environment (Israel), finally as a political tool, and symbol of regional dominance and prestige (South Africa).

Despite these peculiarities, the most important deterrence was between the Western and Eastern bloc. Considering the overwhelming conventional forces of Warsaw Pact in Europe, it is easy to find rationale for precisely conducted nuclear deterrence strategies. With the fall of Iron Curtain and collapse of Soviet empire, this accent on one-way oriented nuclear deterrence disappeared. However, the stockpiles of nuclear warheads (and the means of their transport) remained virtually untouched.

Post-Cold War deterrence

The Cold War era balance of power was about the balance of two opposing ideologies, which are enemies from definition and the rational calculations were quite easy. Since NATO’s Massive Retaliation strategy (following the ideas of Assured Destruction) had determination to prevent aggressor from ‘ability to shape the character of war’ (Segal, Moreton, Freedman & Baylis, 1983, pp.83) and considering Warsaw Pact’s conventional superiority, there was no place for local clashes. Any aggression would have been terminated. Cold War deterrence offered the only result of superpowers’ war calculations – MAD. Rational actor did not have different choice than to decide not to incite open aggression. What of these transferred to post-Cold War times?

Accepting the realists’ description of world as an anarchic system, where self-help is the only guaranteed way to secure own existence, nuclear proliferation and consequent deterrent acting may seem as inevitable. There is notion among some structural realists that modern nuclear deterrence will lead to similar consequences as during the Cold War – higher stability (Sagan & Waltz, 2003). However, there are some serious challenges to this idea.

Firstly, MAD should be announced dead. The fall of Eastern Bloc not only lowered the direct military tension, but also brought other important implications, considering nuclear deterrence. Economic cooperation among involved nuclear powers has been rising, making the mutual business connections essential for the parties involved (especially in the USA-Chinese case, but also considering vital function of the export of natural resources for Russia or booming mutual trade between India and Pakistan in the last decade). Add at least modest increase of democracy in Russia and China during the last two decades and the concept of MAD gets even further behind the borders of rationality.

There is also another aspect, which makes deterrence via MAD obsolete: the gap in military capabilities of the USA and second biggest nuclear power (Russia) sharply rose. Some works (Lieber & Press, 2006) are suggesting, that USA got very close to the position, where it will be able to prevent or minimalize effects of Russian nuclear response on a surprising first strike, not to mention the rest of potential enemies, who posses minimal amounts of long range ballistic missiles (according to data from Lieber and Press, in 2006 China possessed stock of only 18 missiles able to reach the USA, compared to Russian’s 3500). Similarly, limited amounts of warheads and low protection against the first strike makes MAD hardly possible even for neighboring countries, like China and India.

However, nuclear deterrence itself is not dead, quite the opposite – recent nuclear test performed by North Korea, activities of Iran believed to be aimed at construction of nuclear weapon, but also the effort of the USA to place some parts of the ballistic defense system in Central Europe show us that nuclear deterrence is still alive.
In the bipolar world weaker actors who felt endangered by one of the superpowers or by a local third party could chose a protector, who was happy to offer them cooperation, condescendingly overlooking their moral character. Regional balance of power was shifting with countries joining and changing alliances, global balance of power was maintained by MAD.

It is questionable if a big regional shift of balance can be caused by acquisition of nuclear weapons. It would be possible in case the nukes could be used for military (strategic or just tactical) reasons. Allowing field use of nuclear weapons on any theatre would represent unseen precedent with impact on global stability with hardly predictable results and would probably provoke immediate reaction of leading powers. Israeli opaque nuclearization did not stop its enemies from attacking Israel in 1967 nor in 1973. However, it is believed Israeli’s nuclear alert speeded the military help from the USA (GlobalSecurity.org). North Korean nuclear test did not reshape the balance in the region, on the other hand narrowed the range of response actions for the opponents.

Nuclear proliferation is still considered an ultimate mean of security. Nuclear weapon can smooth up the huge power differences between modern countries (so visible in Iraq and finally not so much visible in Afghanistan) and make all prepared military calculations obsolete. Nuclear weapons are not the way to spread one’s power anymore – they are means to secure power at the level of surviving. Just a single warhead hitting Soul or Tel Aviv may be enough to deter any actions against North Korea or Iran. No matter how small, nuclear arsenal would have to be destroyed by the first strike and in current situation it would be hardly possible to achieve it with conventional weapons. Again, it would involve introduction of nuclear weapons on battlefield with negative consequences outweighing the potential positive gains. This narrowing of strategic options is the most important impact of nuclear deterrence in these days. However, it cannot stop wars at all – it can just change their forms.

Middle East region is ideal location for a demonstration. Israel has been concerned about its safety and existence from the first days of foundation, which led to efforts to gain nuclear weapons. Arab neighbors like Egypt or Jordan have spent only tepid efforts to acquire nuclear capability and they do not consider it top-level priority’ (Evron, 1991, pp. 50). Neither Israel nor other countries represent threat for their existence. On the other hand, Iran may consider threat from the Western countries legitimate and nuclearization is a natural way to securitize status quo.

As suggested by Freedman, it is inevitable for deterrence to be carefully leveraged. While too little deterrence can be ineffective, too much deterrence can achieve opposite reaction than intended (Freedman, 2004). Introducing nuclear deterrence is a big qualitative jump in military deterrence capabilities of any country. While it is irrational to make aggressive steps when it is already implemented, it is fully rational to try to either deter opponents from gaining the weapon, or actively stop him by an aggressive action, as it could be observed in Iraq, where both Iran and Israel bombed the Osirak reactor back in 80′s as a response to his flirting with nuclear weapons program.

So far, nuclear deterrence was described as a clear mechanism, assuming the generally optimistic nature of it. Waltz, the biggest advocate of proliferation, presents five reasons, why nuclear deterrence can ensure higher stability and even "nuclear peace" among countries (Sagan & Waltz, 2003, pp.6-7).

1. The more country gains in war and the closer to the final victory, the higher possibility of nuclear retaliation as defender’s conventional forces lose the ability to inflict damage on the progressing enemy.
2. The costs of war are extremely high and more carefully taken into consideration
3. Nuclear weapon better defend than conquest territory
4. Will to use nuclear weapons is stronger on the side of a defender.
5. Nuclear strength of an adversary can be more easily counted before declaring war than the conventional one

However, also this mechanism can fail. The source of failure is the key position of actors’ rationality in the scheme. To act rationally, actors need information and causal relations between them. ‘Deterrence works best when the targets are able to act rationally, and when the deterrer and the deterred are working within sufficiently shared normative framework so that it is possible to inculcate a sense of appropriate behaviour in defined situations.’ (Freedman, 2004, pp. 5).

While it is hard to set normative for conventional deterrence, it is almost impossible to set them for nuclear deterrence. There were established unofficial ten commandments of nuclear deterrence (Krepon, 2003):

• Do not change the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by use of force.
• Avoid nuclear brinksmanship.
• Avoid dangerous military practices.
• Put in place special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces.
• Implement properly treaty obligations, risk-reduction, and confidence-building measures. Agree on verification arrangements, including intrusive monitoring.
• Establish reliable lines of communication, between political leaders and between military leaders.
• Establish redundant and reliable command and control arrangements as well as intelligence-gathering capabilities to know what the other side is up to, especially in a crisis.
• Keep working hard on these arrangements. Improve them. Don’t take anything for granted.
• Hope for plain dumb luck or divine intervention.

Obviously, these commandments are more stressing the lack of proper rules than serving any other purpose (what is ‘dangerous military practice’?). How can exact rules be set for something, what is suicidal (MAD) or what has unforeseeable consequences (field use of nuclear weapons). MAD is so irrational, that it is impossible to set exact and rational rules. ‘Once basic deterrence becomes mutual, it negates extended deterrence by definition.’ (Betts, 1987, pp.10). These rules can be set for an isolated tactical nuclear attack, but since the mechanism of chain reaction of tactic exchange turning into strategic one is hardly constructible, leaving tactical (or low scale strategic) use of nuclear weapons surrounded by extreme deal of uncertainty. Nuclear attack on homeland would most probably cause nuclear retaliation, but what about nuclear attack on allies – would it be worth starting a nuclear exchange? What will be the reaction on conventional attack on homeland?

Deterrence can easily turn into unwanted aggression, or can fail once the opponent will be able to count the consequences more precisely. This great deal of insecurity embedded in the concept of nuclear deterrence leads to continuous arm race. However, this arms race is not intended to stop the first strike, but to prevent the second strike capability of an enemy. This situation can fuel the potential of aggression – once my technical progress gets me out of the stale mate, I have strong incentive to initiate the first strike and prevent reestablishing the previous balance. Consequently, the opponent has incentive to initiate first-strike, before one’s disbalancing technology becomes operational. As prof. O’Connell mentions, this situation is further complicated not only by ‘inherent limitation in existing capacities to calculate the effectiveness of the others’ military technological capacity, but also from publicized exaggeration of opponents’ weapons and using worst case analyses to ensure maximum security’ (O’Connell, 1982. pp.46). In his view, nuclear deterrence may be just a period of time, during which two enemies are trying to break the stalemate. Action-reaction dynamic of deterrence is unstable and with given arm race it cannot be reproduced infinitely.

Another important criticism comes from organization theory perspective, represented especially by Scott Sagan. He challenges rationality of organizations responsible for the deterrence. ‘They have inherent limits on calculation and coordination and use simplifying mechanisms to understand and respond to uncertainty in the outside world.’ (Sagan & Waltz, 2003, pp.51) This leads to regular malfunction in routines and potential accidents. With ongoing proliferation, the probability of fatal malfunctions rises. These can have either form of technical accident (false alarms, accidental explosions) or agency failure (unauthorized use). Professor O’Connell underlines it: ‘The logic of technology whether civil or military is now global but there is no hope of social organization matching that logic for another generation’ (O’Connell, 1982. pp.46).
Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence, the ability to turn an aggression into an irrational act by having potential to inflict unbearable costs to the aggressor, emerged as soon as at least two actors developed nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Despite serving more purposes in various ways in different regions of the world, nuclear deterrence of the Cold War era was symbolized by the outstanding hegemony of two nuclear superpowers and by the terminal mechanism of MAD. With the fall of Iron Curtain, nuclear deterrence achieved new qualitative range. While the irrationality of nuclear exchange among leading powers went beyond the Cold War limits and nuclear deterrence as a way of world domination is becoming obsolete, in the regional conflicts it may play increasing role. With the loss of bipolarity and two possible protectors, military nuclear technology becomes the tool of ultimate survival in the eyes of some actors.

In spite of the very slow proliferation during the last two decades, it is more than possible that other countries will try to develop nuclear armament. It is not only question of non-democratic states but also of democratic countries like Japan, South Korea or some countries in Latin America, which may reconsider their non-nuclear status. Although USA and other western possessors of nuclear weapons may be deemed as protectors of their unarmed allies, their rational base of their willingness to respond to nuclear threats to these allies may be questioned.

Unfortunately, nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence may hardly increase stability and peace, as it is sometimes suggested. Post Cold War deterrence is being undertaken now in a more complicated and interconnected world, where setting exact action-reaction rules in terms of nuclear engagement is impossible. Without these rules, nuclear deterrence is more an ad-hoc craft than a well working mechanism. The instability is underlined by possible organizational malfunctions and agency failures, especially considering recent rise of rootless threats, like terrorism, which cannot be responded by standard military strategies.

Nuclear deterrence will remain part of our world, but it can hardly regain the strategic dominance it had in the period that ended twenty years ago. Both global and regional actors will have to incorporate the potential of nuclear retaliation into their strategies, their range of actions will be narrower, but this will not stop the actions, which shift the balance of power.

Martin Vlachynsky 2009; Prepared for Theories and Concepts in International Relations class, University of Aberdeen

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